The paper re-examines Rogo¤'s (1985) in ‡uential monetary policy result. It shows that responses of a conservative central banker and the resulting macroeconomic outcomes may be substantially di¤erent if interactions with (ambitious) …scal policy are taken into account.
Introduction
In the theory of monetary policy, conventional results state that discretionary policies will lead to a positive in ‡ation bias; and that an independent and conservative central bank will achieve lower average in ‡ation without losses in average output (Rogo¤ (1985) , Barro and Gordon (1983) ). However, this theory derives from models that exclude …scal policy. In the light of the …nancial crisis of 2007-9, it is important to ask: do these results still hold in the presence of (excessively) active …scal policies?
We show that, under some circumstances, they may not. This is an illustration of an old Tinbergen (1954) proposition, that policy interactions can change outcomes. In order to provide a formal but intuitive treatment, we con…ne ourselves to a familiar reduced-form model. Both policymakers (i) have quadratic preferences over in ‡ation and output, and both (ii) can directly or indirectly a¤ect both of these variables.
Importantly, the policymakers are assumed to be fully independent in setting their policies. We thus focus on the indirect policy interactions in the Sargent and Wallace (1981) sense, and control for any direct linkages as examined by Walsh (1995) , Lohmann (1992) and the subsequent literatures.
2. Model 2.1. Setup. Our setting is a straightforward extension of Barro and Gordon (1983) , which serves as a simpli…ed representation of the Rogo¤'s (1985) model. The framework keeps all the original features and hence allows a direct comparison. We focus, as Rogo¤ (1985) does, on a one shot game.
3 The Lucas supply relationship summarizes the economy and also includes the e¤ect of …scal policy (1)
x t = ( t e t ) + g t + " t ; where x; ; e ; and g denote the output gap, in ‡ation, in ‡ation expected by the public, and the growth rate of real debt respectively. The supply shock " has a zero mean and variance 2 " . The parameters > 0 and 0 denote the potency of monetary and …scal policy respectively. 4 We de…ne the growth rate of real debt in the standard fashion (2) g t = G t t ; where G is the growth rate of nominal debt (which can be thought of as the size of budget de…cit, where G t = 0 expresses a balanced budget). G and represent monetary (M ) and …scal (F ) policy instruments that are assumed to be independently set and perfectly controlled.
The policymakers'one period utility function follows the convention in the literature:
where i 2 fM; F g is the set of players and the in ‡ation target of both policymakers is normalized to zero. Further, i > 0 denotes the degree of policy conservatism (lower i values denoting greater conservatism). We will refer to M < F and M F as the cases of conservative and liberal central banker respectively. The parameter x i T 0 denotes the degree of policy ambition. We distinguish between two types of policymaker: the responsible with x i T = 0; and the ambitious with x i T > 0:
6
The public is, like the policymakers, assumed to be rational and have complete information about the structure of the economy and the policymakers' preferences. These standard assumptions will enable us to focus on the policy interaction as there will be no reputational issues.
7 Following the literature, the policymakers are assumed to be able to observe the shock in real time (ie " t before making their t period move).
In terms of the public, as a robustness check we will consider two scenarios. First, it is information symmetry (denoted by S) in which the public can observe the shock in real time (as in Cukierman (2001) and Gersbach (2003) ). Second, it is information asymmetry (denoted by A) in which the public cannot do so (as in Rogo¤ (1985) ).
2.2. Solution: The Rogo¤ Case. This case, denoted by R; will refer to a situation in which = 0. Using these assumptions, and (1)- (3), we have the following equilibrium outcomes under information symmetry and asymmetry (4)
2.3. Solution: The Interaction Case. This case, denoted by I; will refer to a situation in which > 0. Focusing on the one shot simultaneous game we have, using (1)-(3), the following equilibrium in ‡ation and output under information symmetry and asymmetry
Naturally, the steady-state levels of in ‡ation, nominal debt and output (which we denote below by bar) are the same under symmetry and asymmetry -in both the Rogo¤ and the Interaction cases (compare (4) with (5) and (6) with (7)). 8 6 We prefer the term ambitious to irresponsible since we want to allow, following Rogo¤ (1985) , for the socially optimal output gap target to be positive.
7 For an alternative case in which the players' actions cannot be reconsidered every period (due to costly wage bargaining, information gathering, or due to the policymakers'commitment), see eg Libich, Hughes Hallett and Stehlík (2007) . For analysis of reputation see Backus and Dri¢ ll (1985) or Hughes . 8 Let us note that our model's speci…cation does not include some long-term budget constraint of the government. We do so to better describe the excessively ambitious behaviour of real world governments. Because of that, the steady-state outcomes should be interpreted as medium-run rather than long-run.
Results
To keep the paper focussed, we will only report results that deviate from the …ndings of Rogo¤ (1985) . 9 Our Propositions 1-3 are applicable regardless of the assumption on the public's information set, as they relate to the steady-state outcomes. Proposition 1. (Time-consistency) In the Rogo¤ case, the in ‡ation target is timeinconsistent if and only if M is ambitious, and time-consistent if and only if M is responsible. In the Interaction case, the target may be time-inconsistent even if M is responsible, and time-consistent even if M is ambitious.
Proof. The proposition …rst claims that R 6 = 0 i¤ x M T > 0 and R = 0 i¤ x M T = 0; which follows by inspection of (4)-(5). 10 The second claim is that there exist parameter values under which I 6 = 0 even if x M T = 0; and I = 0 even if x M T > 0: Inspection of (6)- (7) reveals that the former is the case under x F T > 0 and 6 = ; and the latter under
This proposition shows that the conventional wisdom implied by the Barro-Gordon literature may be too optimistic under some circumstances and too pessimistic in others. In terms of being too optimistic, it shows that achieving the in ‡ation target (on average) and its credibility is not guaranteed even if the central banker is fully independent, highly conservative, and targets the natural rate of output responsibly. Intuitively, a responsible central banker may …nd it optimal to in ‡ate in an attempt to reduce the over-expansionary e¤ect of F policy -higher in ‡ation decreases the real value of the debt and hence stabilizes output closer to the natural rate. That is the justi…cation for Dixit and Lambertini's (2003) concern that monetary policy cannot be committed if …scal policy is not pre-committed at the same time.
In terms of being too pessimistic, it shows that the in ‡ation target may be delivered and credible even if the central bank is not conservative and ambitiously aims at abovenatural output. This is because of the o¤setting e¤ect of the interaction with F policy. These …ndings suggest that studying M policy in isolation, without the in ‡uence of F policy, can be seriously misleading.
Proposition 2. (De ‡ation)
In the Rogo¤ case, a de ‡ation bias cannot occur. In the Interaction case, both in ‡ation and de ‡ation biases can occur -under both responsible and ambitious central bankers.
Proof. It is claimed that R 0 for all parameter values. This follows by inspection of (4)-(5). Further, it is argued that parameter values exist under which I < 0 for both x M T = 0 and x M T > 0. This can be seen in (6)-(7). The former obtains if < and x F T > 0; and the latter under either < and x F T > x M T ; or > and x F T < x M T .
9 For additional results from this model and its extensions, see Hughes Hallett, Libich, and Stehlík (2009). 10 This implies that if the central bank was to announce the optimal zero in ‡ation target, it would renege on its announcement. The rational public will expect this and hence the optimal target announcement will lack credibility, for more see Kydland and Prescott (1977) .
Intuitively, an ambitious M may optimally de ‡ate since under some circumstances de ‡ation may stimulate the economy better than in ‡ation -by increasing the value of real debt and hence magnifying the expansionary e¤ect of F policy.
Proposition 3. (E¤ ect on Average In ‡ation)
In the Rogo¤ case, a more conservative M policymaker either reduces average in ‡ation, or does not alter average in ‡ation. In the Interaction case a more conservative M may increase average in ‡ation, and may do so even if he is the responsible type (ie for all x M T 0). The direction of the e¤ ect of M policy conservatism on the average level of in ‡ation depends on 1) the relative degree of M and F policy ambition, and 2) the relative potency of M and F policy.
Proof. We need to show that the R is either increasing in, or independent of, M . Inspection of (4)- (5) shows that this is the case under x M T > 0 and x M T = 0 respectively. Equations (6)- (7) then prove the second claim by showing that under either < and x M T < x F T ; or > and x M T > x F T , we have I decreasing in M . Finally, the sign of the e¤ect of M on I is a function of ( ) and (x F T x M T ) which completes the proof. It is usually argued that the longer term e¤ects of a …scal expansion are smaller than the impact of a change in monetary policy. That suggests < . In that case, the central bank will try to restrain the in ‡ationary e¤ects caused by the …scal expansion which follows naturally if x M T < x F T . But that would create a de ‡ation bias since the …scal expansion is less powerful than the monetary restraint, so that G I 6 = 0, where x F T is large and small, is overcome. That yields I < 0 and x I > 0 in (6). Increasing conservatism would reduce this de ‡ation bias because the central bank, being less concerned with its own x M T , will reduce its attempts to o¤set x F T and …scal policy will have less need of a re ‡ation. Greater conservatism therefore creates greater discipline with a smaller de ‡ation threat, and the conventional negative relationship between in ‡ation and central bank conservatism becomes reversed. Figure 1 presents an illustration of the claims of Propositions 1-3 for the Interaction case, showing (i) the time-inconsistency of the in ‡ation target in the Rogo¤ sense, I 6 = 0; for almost all parameter values, (ii) the possible de ‡ation, I < 0, and (iii) the decrease as well as the increase of average in ‡ation in
Proposition 4. (Stabilization of Shocks) Assume a negative shock to output, " t < 0.
(i) In the Rogo¤ case, the central banker (of any M and x M T ) always eases M conditions in response to the shock. In the Interaction case, depending on the relative potency of M and F policy, the central banker (of any M and x M T and in both the symmetry and asymmetry scenarios) may either ease or tighten M conditions, or not respond to the shock at all. Furthermore, even for given potencies and ; the appointment of a conservative central banker may reverse the direction of the optimal M policy response.
(ii) In the Rogo¤ case, the equilibrium levels of in ‡ation and output always depend on the shock. In the Interaction case, these levels may be independent of the shock. (iii) In the Rogo¤ case, the shock is better stabilized -both in ‡ation and output are less variable -in the asymmetry scenario than in the symmetry scenario. In the Interaction case this is not the case.
Proof. See the Appendix. These results are again due to the joint e¤ects of M and F policy -the policies not only respond to shocks, but also to each other. In terms of the …rst statement in (i), in the absence of F policy the central banker attempts to stabilize output after " t < 0 by surprise in ‡ating. However, in the presence of F policy there is an additional output stabilization option -lower in ‡ation increases the value of real debt and boosts the economy in the desired direction. Which of the two options will be chosen therefore depends on how potent M policy is relative to F policy.
The second statement in (i) is yet stronger. It shows that for a given potency of the policies, under the symmetry scenario a liberal central banker may respond to the shock by tightening whereas a conservative central banker may ease monetary conditions. Intuitively, since the shock has a contractionary e¤ect on the real economy, the F policymaker will attempt to o¤set that contraction by increasing the de…cit and nominal debt; see (7). But the sign of this F response as a function of the central bank conservatism can be positive as well as negative ( (7) shows that G I t may be increasing or decreasing in M ). Hence the reversion in the M response after the appointment of a conservative central banker is induced by the change in the nature of F responses after this appointment.
Claim (ii) shows that since the optimal responses of M and F policies may turn out to be of equal magnitude, they may cancel each other out. Then the equilibrium values of in ‡ation and output can be una¤ected by the shock.
Finally, claim (iii) casts doubt on the conventional wisdom that the central banker's private information necessarily leads to an improvement in the stabilization outcomes as it may be exploited to surprise the public. This is because in the presence of F policy there exists and additional instrument and hence the stabilization of shocks may not require an informational asymmetry to be exploited.
Conclusion
The paper shows that including …scal policy and its interactions with monetary policy in a simple Barro and Gordon (1983) type model can, under certain circumstances, reverse the standard conclusions on how monetary policy a¤ects macroeconomic variables. In particular, in contrast to the in ‡uential result of Rogo¤ (1985) it shows that an appointment of a conservative central banker may (i) increase the average level of in ‡ation; or (ii) decrease this level too much producing de ‡ation; and/or (iii) alter the nature (direction) of the monetary responses to shocks.
Our analysis therefore suggests that monetary-…scal policy interactions may have important implications for the optimal institutional design of both policies. Nevertheless, as our insights have been obtained from a simple reduced-form model, more research is needed to assess their real world relevance (eg for the current …nancial crisis), and formulate speci…c policy recommendations.
Appendix: Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. The reaction functions of the central banker in the Interaction case are, under symmetry and asymmetry respectively, the following
